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“Words, as is well known, are the great foes of reality.”
I.

1

INTRODUCTION

It is a common urge among people, lawyers and laypersons
alike, to demand that any agreement or contract be put in writing.
A part of that desire amongst the populace is the unfounded idea
2
A more significant
that oral agreements are unenforceable.
aspect, however, is the desire to protect oneself from
misrepresentations of the other party and to have the terms of the
3
agreement visible and recorded for posterity. Written contracts
are more desirable than oral agreements because they protect
against mistaken parties and they make it easier for a court to
4
determine the intent of the parties during a dispute.
When interpreting a contract, the court must apply various
5
accepted common law interpretation devices. A court first looks at
6
the plain meaning of the language. If the plain meaning of the
terms is unambiguous, then the court holds parties to those terms
7
If there are any
so long as there are no absurd results.
ambiguities, then the court can either look at extrinsic evidence,
1. JOSEPH CONRAD, UNDER WESTERN EYES 3 (Harper & Brothers Publishers
1911) (1911), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=8P99Y2HWGK4C&
printsec=frontcover&dq=Under+Western+Eyes#PPA3,M1.
2. See McArdle v. Williams, 193 Minn. 433, 438, 258 N.W. 818, 820 (1935)
(noting that contracts are made orally and also by the conduct of the parties). A
contract is enforceable “whether it is expressed (1) in writing, (2) orally, (3) in
acts, or (4), partly in one of these ways and partly in others.” Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1932)); cf. Dusenka v. Dusenka, 221
Minn. 234, 238, 21 N.W.2d 528, 530 (1946) (determining that agreements without
clear intent, such as was present in McArdle v. Williams, are enforceable only as
judicially created quasi-contracts and are not really contracts at all).
3. See Johnson Bldg. Co. v. River Bluff Dev. Co., 374 N.W.2d 187, 194 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985). “We could find that reliance on an oral representation was
unjustifiable as a matter of law only if the written contract provision explicitly
stated a fact completely contradictory to the claimed misrepresentation.” Id.
(emphasis added).
4. See Benson v. Markoe, 37 Minn. 30, 35, 33 N.W. 38, 40 (1887) (holding
that a court in equity will exercise its jurisdiction over a mistake of law where “only
very clear and convincing proofs will be sufficient to overcome the presumption
that the written instruments which parties have executed for the purpose of
evidencing and carrying into effect their agreements are in legal effect or in terms
contrary to their intention”).
5. See infra Part VI.
6. See infra Part VI.A.
7. See infra Part VI.
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or, if none is available, resolve the ambiguity against the drafting
8
party.
Lee v. Fresenius Medical Care, Inc. is a case that revolves entirely
9
around these issues of contract interpretation. Vacation pay has
10
developed in Minnesota to be purely a contractual obligation.
The language of the contract must be interpreted according to the
11
This case note will
basic precepts of contract interpretation.
outline those devices of interpretation and apply them to the Lee
12
In Lee, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to properly
case.
interpret the employment contract because of its desire to protect
13
business interests. The supreme court could have interpreted the
contract to find that Lee had a right to Paid Time Off (PTO),
14
The
without creating a substantive right to vacation pay.
Minnesota Supreme Court could have used other remedies in this
case, such as equitable estoppel and disproportionate forfeiture, to
15
arrive at a different and more equitable outcome.
This note begins with an examination of how courts in
Minnesota have created the contractual nature of vacation pay and
16
It then
how other jurisdictions treat vacation pay contracts.
17
The
details the Lee case and outlines the majority decision.
proper common law contractual interpretation devices are then
18
detailed and applied to the Lee case. Then, it analyzes the Lee
19
majority’s failure to use basic contract interpretation methods.
20
Other possible outcomes are outlined, and the note concludes
that the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to truly uphold the
contractual nature of vacation pay and provides a windfall for
21
employers at employees’ expense.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part VI.B.
Lee v. Fresenius Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. 2007).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part VI.A.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VIII.
See infra Part VIII.A–B.
See infra Part III.
See infra Parts IV, V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
See infra Part VIII.
See infra Part IX.
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF WORDS TO CONTRACTS
The relationship between words and contracts is exceptionally
close-knit. It is through words that one discovers the intent of a
22
contract.
When a writing is the “complete and exclusive
23
statement of the terms of an agreement,” the courts can only look
to the words of the document to effectuate the intent and to fulfill
24
the purpose of the agreement.
The words, then, are the most
significant and important means by which a party can express its
intent to a court and to the other party involved.
The Minnesota legislature has recognized the importance of
25
words to a contract. The Minnesota Plain Language Contract Act
requires that all consumer contracts “be written in a clear and
coherent manner using words with common and everyday
26
Although this statute applies only to consumer
meanings.”
contracts, the intent of the legislature is clear. It intends to protect
unwary consumers from being forced into unfortunate and possibly
inequitable contract terms due to inherent vagueness or

22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) (1981) (stating that a
court must give “reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms” when
interpreting a contract). See also Dayton Park Props., L.L.P. v. Pac. Life Ins. Co.,
370 F. Supp. 2d 869, 871 (D. Minn. 2005) (citing Knudsen v. Transp.
Leasing/Contract, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that
intent of the contract as expressed within the “four corners of the instrument” is
controlling)).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210(1) (1981). This type of
written contract is assumed to contain all the terms of an agreement and so the
meaning of the words used determines the interpretation of that contract. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 cmt. a (1981).
24. Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Rude, 21 F.2d 257, 261 (8th Cir. 1927) (stating
that “courts of law must enforce written contracts according to the language used
by the contracting parties” provided that the interpretation is rational and doesn’t
defeat the purpose of the contract). See, e.g., Metro Office Parks v. Control Data
Corp., 295 Minn. 348, 353, 205 N.W.2d 121, 124 (1973) (holding that a party must
provide “clear and convincing evidence that a mistake has been made” to vary the
intent manifested in the contract); W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Minn. Workers’ Comp.
Insurers Ass’n, Inc., No. C5–98–1244, 1999 Minn. App. LEXIS 148, at *5–6 (Minn.
Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1999) (stating that the “primary purpose in construing a contract
is to give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the language they
used in drafting the entire contract”).
25. See MINN. STAT. § 325G.31 (2006). This statute was originally passed in
1981, was effective in 1983, and has not been amended since. See Plain Language
Contract Act, 1981 Minn. Laws 1245–46, ch. 274 § 3 (effective July 1, 1983).
26. MINN. STAT. § 325G.31 (2006). This statute does not apply in the case of
an employment contract and is merely included to deduce the legislative ideas
concerning the readability of contact terms.
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27

unwarranted sophistication.
Although oral contracts are generally enforceable in
28
Minnesota, a written contract is preferred because it is a formality
that makes it clear what duties are required and what obligations
29
and services must be rendered. Some agreements are considered
to be too important to even be considered enforceable without a
30
writing and, as such, a writing is required by statute. A written
contract is considered to be the best way to guard against spurious
31
claims. There is a great responsibility on the drafting party, if it
desires courts to understand and abide by its intent, to use words
32
that are unambiguous and have a plain and ordinary meaning.
Without this, courts would be blind in their contractual
determinations. Courts have devised various techniques aimed at
ascertaining the intent and meaning of the contract from the words
33
contained within it. This is the task of contract interpretation.
For the vacation pay at dispute in Lee v. Fresenius Medical Care,
Inc. to be subject to contract interpretation, it must first be
34
If
determined that vacation pay is a contractual obligation.
vacation pay is a contractual option, then any terms regarding
vacation pay must be subject to the basic common law
27. See Anderson v. McOskar Enters., Inc., 712 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2006). Although this case does not comment explicitly on the legislative
intent behind Minnesota Statutes section 325G.31, it does state that ambiguous
contract terms must be strictly construed against the benefitted party and a court
must determine if the contract terms contravene public policy before it can
enforce the contract. See id. This indicates an understanding that a party must be
protected against language that may be difficult to comprehend because that party
may be subject to inequitable contract terms. See id.
28. Mages v. Johanns, 431 F.3d 1132, 1141 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing McArdle v.
Williams, 193 Minn. 433, 258 N.W. 818, 820 (1935)).
29. See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, The Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 540 (1998).
30. See Schwinn v. Griffith, 303 N.W.2d 258, 260 (Minn. 1981). See also
Hagelin v. Wacks, 61 Minn. 214, 216, 63 N.W. 624, 625 (1895). The current
statute of frauds in Minnesota requires a writing for agreements that are not to be
performed within a year, that require the payment of another’s debt, that are in
consideration of marriage, and that require paying a debt that was discharged by
bankruptcy. MINN. STAT. § 513.01 (2006). “The statute of frauds was enacted in
the reign of Charles II, nearly 200 years since, and . . . has been adopted with a
remarkable approach to unanimity, not only in England, but in this country.”
Morin v. Martz, 13 Minn. 191, 192 (1868).
31. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 14 (5th ed. 2006).
32. See cases cited supra note 24.
33. See infra Part VI.
34. 741 N.W.2d 117, 127–28 (Minn. 2007).
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35

interpretation devices that are used in Minnesota.
The court
must first determine if vacation pay is contractual or statutory, and
then it must apply either contractual or statutory interpretation to
36
the provisions in question.
III. THE CONTRACTUAL FOUNDATION FOR VACATION PAY
Minnesota courts have been grappling with the issue of
vacation pay for many years. An employee of the Duluth, Missabe
and Iron Range Railway Company brought about the first
significant case involving vacation pay because he felt he was
37
wrongfully discharged under a collective bargaining agreement.
That agreement included a provision in which an employee was
38
eligible for vacation pay after fulfilling certain requirements. The
court held that, under the contract, termination from employment
39
also terminated eligibility for vacation pay. The court used the
contract almost exclusively to decide the eligibility for vacation pay,
40
which grounded the issue firmly in the realm of contracts.
In 1956, the court furthered the contractual nature of vacation
41
pay. In Tynan v. KSTP, Inc., there was an employment contract
between the plaintiff and his employer that determined eligibility
42
for vacation pay. The court debated the existence of the contract
because of a strike and the expiration of a collective bargaining
43
agreement. Ultimately, the court found the agreement to be a
44
valid contract. The court held that the employee earned the right
to those vacation benefits because he fulfilled all eligibility
35. See infra Part VI.
36. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 124–29.
37. Edelstein v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry. Co., 225 Minn. 508, 31
N.W.2d 465 (1948).
38. Id. at 524, 31 N.W.2d at 474. To be eligible for vacation pay, an employee
was required to work for at least 160 days and still be employed at the time of the
vacation pay request. Id. at 516, 31 N.W.2d at 470.
39. Id. at 524, 31 N.W.2d at 474.
40. See id. at 522, 31 N.W.2d at 473.
41. See Tynan v. KSTP, Inc., 247 Minn. 168, 177, 178, 77 N.W.2d 200, 206
(1956). The court refers to the Edelstein decision and other cases such as
Marranzano v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 184 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1950) and Dusenka v.
Dusenka, 221 Minn. 234, 21 N.W.2d 528 (1946). Tynan, 247 Minn. at 177–78, 77
N.W.2d at 206.
42. Id. at 179, 77 N.W.2d at 207. The contract stated that an employee was
eligible for fourteen days of vacation after working for at least six months and
twenty-one days of vacation after working for at least one year. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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requirements and that right was, in legal effect, choate.
In Brown v. Tonka, Corp., the employee contract initially
allowed for the payment of earned but unused vacation hours so
46
long as the employment was ended in specific ways. The contract
was later modified to restrict the eligibility for vacation pay to only
those employees who had worked the entire year and into the next
47
The court held that the employees were “terminated
year.
48
without cause” and, thus, were entitled to their pay. The contract
contained an express provision that enabled terminated employees
to receive vacation pay, and the contract modification did not
49
Since vacation pay is purely contractual, the
affect this rule.
50
employers were bound by their contract.
Minnesota is not the only state to have a continuing debate on
vacation pay. It is generally determined across jurisdictions that
vacation pay is not a gratuity but is considered wages or
51
compensation for performance. The difficulty, however, arises in
determining when an employee’s right to payment for those wages
52
vests. Some state courts have held that conditions precedent to
the vesting of a right to vacation pay can be expressly agreed to in
53
Other jurisdictions lean the other way and have
the contract.
45. Id. This means that the right to the vacation pay is fully effective because
it has “ripened or become perfected.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (8th ed.
2004).
46. 519 N.W.2d 474, 475 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). The court stated that the
termination must be of one of three types and emphasized the final condition: “1)
resignation with notice of one week for office hourly and two weeks for salaried
employees; 2) voluntary and medical-related separation; 3) involuntary separation
for other than cause.” Id. (emphasis in original).
47. Id. at 476. The problem that arose in Brown v. Tonka, Corp. was that
Hasbro, Inc. bought out the employer in May 1991, closed the employee’s plant,
and terminated all employees on December 31, 1991. Id. The employees sought
payment for their 1991 vacation benefits even though they were terminated before
their work could extend into 1992. Id.
48. Id. at 478.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. 19 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 54.35 (4th ed. 2001).
52. See id. See also Lee v. Fresenius Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117 (Minn.
2007).
53. See, e.g., Sweet v. Stormont Vail Reg’l Med. Ctr., 647 P.2d 1274, 1281 (Kan.
1982) (holding that a two-week notice provision was a condition precedent to the
vesting of a right to payment for unused vacation hours); Rowell v. Jones & Vining,
Inc., 524 A.2d 1208, 1211 (Me. 1987) (deciding that a condition precedent on
eligibility does not divest vacation pay because that pay was not earned until the
condition was met).
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found a more fundamental or substantive right to vacation pay.
Minnesota recently revisited the issue of vacation pay in the case of
Lee v. Fresenius Medical Care, Inc.
IV. LEE V. FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE, INC.
In December 1991, Susan Lee was hired as a dialysis patient
55
care technician for Miller-Dwan Hospital in Duluth, Minnesota.
In September 2000, Fresenius Medical Care, Inc. (Fresenius)
56
Upon Lee’s
purchased the dialysis unit from Miller-Dwan.
transition into the new company, she was issued a copy of the
employee handbook, which detailed the company’s vacation time
57
or paid time off (PTO) policies. The PTO provisions stated that
employees “accrue PTO hours at a set rate per pay period . . . [and]
58
begin to earn PTO upon hire. . . .” Lee signed the employee
handbook and continued working until her termination for
59
misconduct on August 13, 2002 after having allegedly accrued
60
181.86 hours of PTO. The employee handbook also provided for
payment of earned but unused PTO hours upon resignation with
proper notice, but did not allow for payment of those PTO hours
upon resignation without proper notice or termination for
54. See, e.g., Thompson v. Cheyenne Mountain Sch. Dist. No. 12, 844 P.2d
1235, 1237 (Colo. App. 1992) (concluding that unless there is an unequivocal and
unambiguous express contractual provision detailing when the right to vacation
pay vests, the court should imply a right to compensation to avoid forfeiture). See
also Stall v. Prof’l Divers of New Orleans, Inc., 739 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (La. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that vacation pay is considered wages and under a mandatory
payment statute the employer is required to pay regardless of contractual
conditions).
55. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 119.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 120. The court also stated that the terms “vacation time” and “paid
time off” were used interchangeably within the employee handbook and the terms
did not need to be distinguished. Id. at 120 n.1.
58. Id. at 120. The beginning PTO rate for new employees is 7.69 hours per
pay period, and PTO must be requested by the employee and then approved by a
supervisor. Id.
59. Id. Lee was terminated for misconduct after six separate safety violations
ranging from failing to cover her mouth while coughing to offering a patient a bag
of wild mushrooms. Id. at 120–21. Lee stated that her termination was based
upon her alleged union activity, but the National Labor Relations Board found no
merit to that claim. Id. at 121 n.2. She also failed to make this claim in her
original lawsuit, so the court refused to decide the issue because it could not be
raised on appeal. Id. at 130.
60. Id. at 121.
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61

misconduct.
After her termination, Fresenius paid Lee the hourly wages
62
After approximately two years
owed but not her unused PTO.
elapsed, Lee brought a claim in Saint Louis County Conciliation
63
The
Court in order to recover payment for her unused PTO.
64
conciliation court found for Lee in the amount of $5,053.80.
Fresenius appealed the order and the court granted the appeal and
65
removal to Saint Louis County District Court. Both parties filed
66
motions for summary judgment with the district court. The court
granted Fresenius’ motion and denied Lee’s on the grounds that
Lee was not eligible for earned but unused vacation pay under
67
She did not meet the
Minnesota Statutes section 181.13(a).
contractual eligibility requirement of proper notice set forth in the
employee handbook, and Fresenius was under no obligation to pay
68
her.
Lee promptly appealed her case to the Minnesota Court of
Appeals, which reversed the district court, reasoning that PTO is
the same as “wages” under the statute and Lee had accrued or
69
earned those wages during her career. Those wages were earned
and unpaid upon her termination, and therefore, Fresenius was
70
obligated to pay her under the statute. Fresenius appealed the
decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which then reversed the
71
court of appeals and reinstated the district court’s judgment.

61. Id. at 120.
62. Id. at 121.
63. Id.
64. Id. The award included the value of Lee’s PTO ($3,011.60) as well as a
penalty for Fresenius’ failure to pay within 24 hours of Lee’s demand. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 122. “When any employer employing labor within this state
discharges an employee, the wages or commissions actually earned and unpaid at
the time of the discharge are immediately due and payable upon demand of the
employee.” MINN. STAT. § 181.13(a) (2006).
68. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 122.
69. Id.
70. Lee v. Fresenius Med. Care, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 222, 226 (Minn. Ct. App.
2006), rev’d, 741 N.W.2d 117 (2007). The court also held that even though an
employer is only obligated to pay vacation wages under contract, any contract that
would provide for the withholding of that pay is statutorily prohibited and thus an
illegal contract. See id. at 225 (quoting Winnetka Partners Ltd. P’ship v. County of
Hennepin, 538 N.W.2d 912, 914 (Minn. 1995)).
71. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 130.
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V. THE LEE V. FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE, INC. MAJORITY’S REASONING
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning revolves around a
few central elements. The first is that Minnesota common law
generally holds that there is no substantive right to vacation pay,
72
only a contractual right. The employee handbook that outlined
the PTO benefits for Lee was a binding contract, but under the
terms of that contract, Lee would only be entitled to those benefits
73
if she resigned with proper notice. Since Lee was terminated for
74
misconduct, she was not entitled to payment for her unused PTO.
The court also determined that, although common law in
general, as well as Minnesota case law, has determined vacation pay
75
to be part of an employee’s wages, vacation pay is not covered
76
under the mandatory payment provisions of section 181.13(a).
The court held the statute is merely a timing provision determining
when an employer must pay the employee’s earned but unpaid
77
wages.
The court extended its analysis further to an interpretation of
the contract in the employee handbook. It decided that, since a
right to vacation pay is contractual, an employer can place any
78
conditions upon that right that it finds necessary. Although Lee
earned the right to use her PTO during her career, the provision
requiring resignation with notice was a condition precedent to the
79
vesting of her right to payment of PTO as wages. Lee did not
fulfill this condition and therefore had no right to the PTO
80
payments. The court’s decision allows an employment contract to
place any conditions on earning PTO wages without violating the
72. Id. at 123; see Tynan v. KSTP, Inc., 247 Minn. 168, 177, 77 N.W.2d 200,
206 (1956); Brown v. Tonka, Corp., 519 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
73. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120.
74. Id. at 123–24.
75. Id. at 124 (citing Kohout v. Shakopee Foundry Co., 281 Minn. 401,
403–04, 162 N.W.2d 237, 238–39 (1968); 19 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A.
LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 54.35 (4th ed. 2001)).
76. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 125.
77. Id. The court interprets the statute as a timing provision determining
when an employer must pay the employee’s earned but unpaid wages, not what
payment it mandates. Id. This interpretation is out of deference to the so-called
legislative intent that there be no substantive right to vacation pay, and the desire
to avoid creating a cause of action to challenge the nonpayment of wages apart
from the criminal liability for employers under Minnesota Statutes section 181.74.
Id. at 125–26.
78. Id. at 126.
79. Id. at 127.
80. Id.
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81

payment provisions of section 181.13(a).
It follows that any
employment contract that places a condition on the payment,
rather than the earning of vacation pay, would allow for a
82
divestiture of earned wages and would violate the statute.
VI. DEVICES OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO LEE V. FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE, INC.
A. Plain and Ordinary Meaning Rule
The initial contract interpretation device is the plain and
ordinary meaning rule. Language within a contract must be given
83
its plain and ordinary meaning. The Minnesota Supreme Court
has also defined plain and ordinary meaning to be the “usual and
accepted meaning” or the “plain, ordinary, and popular”
84
If the “contract is unambiguous, then the language
meaning.
must be given its plain and ordinary meaning and will be enforced
85
even if the results are harsh.” If words are clear and the meaning
is easily discernable, then the court should end its interpretation
86
because “there is no room for construction.”
Determining the plain meaning of words is more difficult on
81. See id. at 128.
82. Id. at 134 (Page, J., dissenting). This is pointed out by the dissent in its
analysis that the plain meaning of the employment contract indicated that there
were no conditions placed upon earning PTO, but that the conditions in the
contract were placed upon the payment of PTO and thus were invalid. Id.
83. Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394
(Minn. 1998) (citing Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Eagles Lodge, 282 Minn.
477, 479, 165 N.W.2d 554, 556 (1969)). “In interpreting a contract, the language
is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. This holds true in other
jurisdictions as well. See, e.g., Office of Labor Relations v. New England Health
Care Employees Union, Dist. 1199, AFL-CIO, 951 A.2d 1249, 1254 (Conn. 2008)
(discussing a more liberal approach allowing “[a] fair and reasonable construction
of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common,
natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the
subject matter of the contract”); Jacobson v. DP Partners Ltd. P’ship, 245 S.W.3d
102, 106 (Tex. App. 2008) (discussing a stricter approach requiring that “[t]he
parties' intent must be taken from the agreement itself and the agreement must be
enforced as written”).
84. Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 294, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1960); see Carlson
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Canadian Universal
Ins. Co. v. Fire Watch, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Minn. 1977)).
85. Bank Midwest, Minn., Iowa, N.A. v. Lipetzky, 674 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn.
2004) (quoting Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 346–47 (Minn.
2003)).
86. Phil G. Ruvelson, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 235 Minn. 243,
254, 50 N.W.2d 629, 635 (1951).
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its face than it appears due to the very nature of words and their
meanings. The meaning of words can be difficult to grasp because
“a word is a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed
87
meaning. . . .” Meaning is merely the mental word that a written
88
Courts recently, particularly regarding
word represents.
89
contracts, have tried to avoid any foray into the mental realm.
The task then becomes to determine the meaning of the language
90
that a reasonable person would place on it. “Courts frequently
look to dictionaries and case law when determining the ‘plain and
91
ordinary’ meaning of a contract term.” This is certainly the most
reasonable manner in which to determine the plain, ordinary, and
87. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Riging Co., 442 P.2d 641,
644 (Cal. 1968) (quoting Pearson v. State Soc. Welfare Bd., 353 P.2d 33, 39 (Cal.
1960)). Chief Justice Traynor, in his decision for the California Supreme Court,
also held that the words used in the contract are what courts must draw on to
determine and give effect to parties’ contractual intent. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 442
P.2d at 644. Although this case comes from California, it has been cited and used
in Minnesota. See, e.g., Anderson v. Kammeier, 262 N.W.2d 366, 371 n.2 (Minn.
1977) (citing as an example of courts expanding the use of parol evidence in
contract interpretation); Am. Mach. & Tool Co. v. Strite-Anderson Mfg. Co., 353
N.W.2d 592, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing the admissibility of evidence to
prove a meaning of contract language).
88. Michael Devitt, Meaning and Use, 65 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH 106, 110 (2002). The study of semantics is greatly beyond the scope of
this case note, but the aforementioned article is an excellent resource regarding
the analysis of various linguistic meaning concepts. See id.
89. TNT Props., Ltd. v. Tri-Star Developers L.L.C., 677 N.W.2d 94, 102
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004). This concept is called the “objective theory of contracts,”
which the Minnesota courts have adopted. Speckel by Speckel v. Perkins, 364
N.W.2d 890, 893 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
Under this theory, outward
manifestations of the party determine intent and no subjective or mental intent is
considered. Id. Parties express their intent through the language of the contract
so it would be a proper extension of the objective theory to avoid considering the
mental meaning placed on the words by the drafter and only consider the outward
manifestation of that meaning. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203
(1981); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 4.2 (4th ed. 2001); see also Dayton Park Props., L.L.P. v. Pac. Life Ins.
Co., 370 F. Supp. 2d 869, 871 (D. Minn. 2005); Knudsen v. Transp.
Leasing/Contract, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 221, 223 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
90. Lucas v. Ganley Bros., 166 Minn. 7, 11, 206 N.W. 934, 936 (1926) (citing
Symonds v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Minn. 491, 502 (1877)).
91. Ravich v. Datakey, Inc., No. A05-1496, 2006 WL 923722, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 11, 2006) (citing Bank Midwest v. Lipetzky, 674 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Minn.
2004)); cf. Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310–11 (Minn. 1989)
(citing Henning Nelson Const. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 383
N.W.2d 645, 652 (Minn. 1986) (stating that courts should not create ambiguities
in contracts by using language in dictionaries to overcomplicate the plain reading
of the terms)). A contract “must be construed as a whole, and unambiguous
language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id.
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92

popular meaning of the contractual language.
The Lee case turns on the Court’s interpretation of a single
93
word, “earn.” The central questions then are what does the word
“earn” mean and at what point is the right to payment for PTO
hours “earned.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines the verb “earn” as
“[t]o acquire by labor, service, or performance” or “[t]o do
something that entitles one to a reward or result, whether it is
94
received or not.” This definition is particularly telling for the Lee
95
case. Lee acquired her PTO hours by her labor. The contract
provided that Lee would begin to earn her PTO hours upon hire,
and therefore she should have begun to be entitled to them upon
96
hire even if she never received them during her career.
One can also look beyond the legal realm to try to determine
the meaning of words. The Oxford English Dictionary is the
standard for defining the English language. The most pertinent
definition for the term “earn” is “to render an equivalent in labour
or service for (wages); hence to obtain or deserve (money, praise,
97
Lee rendered her
any advantage) as the reward of labour.”
equivalent in labor, 30 hours of work per week, and her reward was
her wages, along with her accrual of 8.08 hours of PTO per pay
98
period.
These definitions would imply that Lee earned her PTO hours
through her labor and thus, upon her termination, the PTO hours
were earned but unused. Since PTO hours are considered wages,
and since these wages were earned but unpaid at the time of
termination, Fresenius should be obligated to pay Lee according to
99
This is the plain meaning of the word
the statutory mandate.
“earn” that is found in the employment contract at issue, and if this
was the only term contained within, then interpretation would end
100
here because there is clearly no ambiguity.
92. See Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 294, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1960).
93. See Lee v. Fresenius Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117, 127 (Minn. 2007).
94. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 547 (8th ed. 2004).
95. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120. “The Paid Time Off (PTO) program allows
you [employee] to receive paid time off based on individual preferences and
varying needs. . . . [A]ccrual depends on your length of service and number of
hours worked. . . . [E]mployees begin to earn PTO upon hire . . . .” Id.
96. See id.
97. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 25 (2d ed. 1991).
98. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120.
99. See MINN. STAT. § 181.13(a) (2006); Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 132–33 (Page, J.,
dissenting).
100. See Phil G. Ruvelson, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 235 Minn.
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Inherent within the plain and ordinary meaning rule is the
101
prohibition against absurd results. A court, when giving meaning
to certain terms of a contract, must protect the integrity of a
contract by ensuring that all terms of the contract are taken in
102
If the plain meaning of one condition creates an
context.
absurdity, then that meaning must be subjugated to other terms
103
that might lead to a more reasonable result. The terms in the Lee
contract that govern vacation pay provide for the unlimited accrual
of PTO hours throughout the employment career and the right to
use those hours at any time during employment upon request of
104
the employee and upon authorization by a supervisor.
This
appears to be a near absolute right to use and receive payment for
PTO while employed.
There are additional terms, however, that state the right to use
and receive payment for PTO ends upon termination for
105
Lee was an at-will employee who could be
misconduct.
terminated at any time and was terminated after six incidents that
106
The
occurred between June 6, 2002 and August 6, 2002.
absurdity that results from the aforementioned condition is that an
employee can accrue an unlimited amount of PTO hours but must
use those hours before being terminated for misconduct—which
can occur at any time without the knowledge of the employee.
This would either inhibit an employee from the contractually
permitted accrual of any significant amount of PTO hours, or it
would force the employee to use all of her PTO hours immediately
before termination for misconduct.
Lee’s first incident of
misconduct occurred on June 6, 2002, and she was fired barely two
107
This interpretation would require Lee to use her
months later.
108
of accrued PTO immediately after her initial
181.86 hours
incident of misconduct for fear that she could be fired at any
moment, without her knowledge, resulting in those hours being
taken away from her. This is clearly an absurd result that must be
243, 254, 50 N.W.2d 629, 635 (1951).
101. Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394
(Minn. 1998) (citing Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Eagles Lodge, 282 Minn.
477, 479, 165 N.W.2d 554, 556 (1969)).
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. Lee v. Fresenius Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. 2007).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 121.
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109

B. Interpretation of Ambiguous Terms
An ambiguity inherently exists in the contract, as well. A
contract term is ambiguous if the language is reasonably
110
The ambiguity in
susceptible to more than one interpretation.
111
the Lee contract arises in the condition to eligibility for payment.
The condition requires proper notice to be eligible for payment of
112
The ambiguity that results is the
earned but unused PTO.
definitive point at which the right to payment for earned but
unused PTO wages vests with the employee. According to the
terms of the contract, an employee has the right to use and be paid
for PTO while employed, and it is only at the point of termination
113
of the contract that the proper notice condition comes into play.
There are two possible outcomes of these terms. The first is
that the right to use and payment for PTO vests with the employee
while employed, and then is divested from the employee upon
termination without proper notice for failing to fulfill that
condition. This outcome would clearly violate the statutory
mandate because it would enable an employer to withhold earned
114
The second possibility is that the right to
but unpaid wages.
payment never fully vests with the employee and the employer has
discretion to allow for the use and payment of PTO during
employment and upon termination. This outcome would enable
employers to withhold payment of PTO because the right to
115
payment was not earned until the notice condition was met.
How then should the court resolve this ambiguity? The first
task is that one can attempt to interpret ambiguous terms by using
extrinsic evidence to “make the court aware of the ‘surrounding
circumstances’” and to allow the court to determine the meanings
116
There does not appear to
that the parties attached to the terms.
109. See Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394
(Minn. 1998).
110. ICC Leasing Corp. v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 257 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Minn.
1977) (citing Metro Office Parks Co. v. Control Data Corp., 295 Minn. 348, 205
N.W.2d 121 (1973)).
111. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See MINN. STAT. § 181.13(a) (2006).
115. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 128. This is the view taken by the majority. Id.
116. 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.7, at 31 (rev. ed.
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be any such circumstances other than Lee signing the employee
117
handbook upon the initiation of employment with Fresenius.
Since an ambiguity exists within the contract and no extrinsic
evidence explains the meaning that each party attached to the
terms, the next step of contract interpretation would be
118
interpretation contra proferentem. This interpretation requires that
119
This
an ambiguous term must be construed against the drafter.
doctrine holds especially true for contracts in which the drafter
controls all the terms and offers the contract on a take-it-or-leave-it
120
basis. “[W]here a contract is open to two interpretations, the one
more favorable to the party who did not draft the instrument
should be adopted in the absence of a clear showing that a contrary
121
meaning was intended by the parties at the time of its execution.”
2008) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. O'Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 771 (Alaska
1982)). This would require a discussion of the parol evidence rule, which
excludes evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements that would vary the
terms of a written and fully integrated contract. See BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY
914 (3d ed. 1969); Borgersen v. Cardiovascular Sys., 729 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2007).
117. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 119–21.
118. KNIFFIN, supra note 116, § 24.27, at 282–83.
119. Hilligoss v. Cargill, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 142, 148 (Minn. 2002) (citing
Current Tech. Concepts, Inc. v. Irie Enters., Inc., 530 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn.
1995)); Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House, 276 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. 1979);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981); see also Deutz & Crow Co., Inc.
v. Anderson, 354 N.W.2d 482, 486–87 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Grandnorthern, Inc.
v. West Mall P’ship, 359 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The policy keeps
the parties on a level playing field because the drafter often has greater bargaining
power to determine which terms are included and which are not. The party will
be more likely to protect its own interests at the expense of the other party. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (1981).
120. Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277
(Minn. 1985) (citing Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970)); see also Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326
N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn. 1982). Adhesion contracts are generally unenforceable as
a matter of public policy because it is imposed on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis by a
party with greater bargaining power without opportunity for negotiation for
services that could not be obtained elsewhere. Anderson v. McOskar Enters., Inc.,
712 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at
924–25). It could be argued that Fresenius’ employee handbook in this case was
an adhesion contract because it was imposed on Lee by a new employer that had a
greater bargaining position, there was no opportunity for negotiation, and Lee was
required to sign it or lose her job. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120; accord Schlobohm, 326
N.W.2d at 924–25, and Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 800. To hold this contract
unenforceable, however, would greatly inhibit the ability of an employer to impose
its own standards and rules on employees of a recently acquired company.
121. Ecolab, Inc. v. Gartland, 537 N.W.2d 291, 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(quoting Wick v. Murphy, 237 Minn. 447, 453, 54 N.W.2d 805, 809 (1952)).
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Since the intention of the parties is determined by the words
in the contract, the language set forth in the contract should be the
122
One reading
determining factor in defining ambiguous terms.
would allow an employee to recover earned but unused wages in
the form of vacation pay upon termination, and the other would
allow an employer to withhold those wages pending the completion
123
The interpretation of
of various contractual provisions.
ambiguous terms, in lieu of any extrinsic evidence to the contrary,
must be the more favorable interpretation to the party who did not
124
Under this interpretation, it would be
draft the contract.
necessary to find that Lee is entitled to payment for her earned but
unused PTO and that Fresenius is required to pay pursuant to
125
statutory mandate.
C. Questions of Law and Questions of Fact
126

An ambiguity clearly exists in the contract’s language.
The
plain meaning analysis of the contract terms indicates that an
employee earns the right to use and be paid for vacation time
during employment, but the right to payment for those earned but
127
unused wages is conditioned upon resignation with notice.
Therefore, there is ambiguity as to exactly when during
employment the ultimate right to payment for earned but unused
128
This ambiguity must be settled before it can
vacation time vests.
be determined if the condition divesting an employee of earned
129
but unused vacation pay violates statutory payment mandates.
Any finding of ambiguity within a contract is a question of
130
but any determination of the meaning of ambiguous
law,
122. See ICC Leasing Corp. v. Midwestern Mach. Co., 257 N.W.2d 551, 554
(Minn. 1977).
123. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120. The condition in question specifically refers
to PTO upon termination as “earned but unused” and it also states that, upon
termination for misconduct, the employer can withhold earned but unused PTO
“unless required by state law.” Id.
124. See Ecolab, 571 N.W.2d at 295; see also Hilligoss, 649 N.W.2d at 148;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
125. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 131 (Page, J., dissenting); accord Ecolab, 571 N.W.2d
at 295.
126. See supra Part VI.B.
127. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120.
128. See supra text accompanying note 112.
129. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 125.
130. Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 346 (Minn. 2003)
(citing Art Goebel, Inc. v. N. Suburban Agencies, Inc., 567 N.W.2d 511, 515
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131

contract terms is a question of fact for a jury. A reasonable court
could find that this contract language is ambiguous. There have
been no factual findings regarding the ambiguities in the contract
because the district court dismissed Lee’s claim by granting
132
Since there is a
Fresenius’ motion for summary judgment.
question as to ambiguity, this must be presented to the jury to
133
determine the meaning of the ambiguous terms. The Minnesota
Supreme Court reviewed the appeal from the Minnesota Court of
134
Appeals that overturned the motion for summary judgment, and
in doing so should have at least remanded the factual issue of the
135
ambiguous terms to the district court for a jury determination.
VII. THE FAILURE OF THE MAJORITY IN LEE V. FRESENIUS MEDICAL
CARE, INC. TO PROPERLY INTERPRET THE CONTRACT
In Lee, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to interpret the
contractual provisions regarding vacation pay within the confines
of accepted common law contract interpretation. Instead, the
majority glossed over the plain meaning of the terms of the
contract in order to fulfill its goals. Had the court followed a plain
meaning analysis, it would have come to a different result. As
stated earlier, the plain meaning of the word “earn” indicates that
an employee’s right to whatever is being earned vests as soon as
(Minn. 1997)); but see Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood, 683 N.W.2d 267,
271 (Minn. 2004) (stating that contract interpretation is a question of law that
must be reviewed de novo). The court cites Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. A.C.C.T.,
Inc., 580 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn. 1998) as its main support for this proposition.
Travertine, 683 N.W.2d at 271. The actual holding in Employers seems to indicate
that de novo review of contract interpretation can occur only when there are no
genuine issues of material fact to consider. See 580 N.W.2d at 493.
131. Denelsbeck, 666 N.W.2d at 346 (citing Turner v. Alpha Phi Sorority House,
276 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn. 1997)). Since the ambiguity of contract terms is a
factual question for a jury, then a de novo review of the contract interpretation of
the lower courts cannot occur until the fact issue is determined. See supra note
103.
132. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 121. A motion for summary judgment is granted when
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. MINN. R. CIV. P. 56.03. On review, any evidence or
possible factual issues must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the party
against whom summary judgment was granted.” George v. Evenson, 754 N.W.2d
335, 339 (Minn. 2008) (citing State Farm Fire Cas. v. Aquila Inc., 718 N.W.2d 879,
883 (Minn. 2006)).
133. See Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394
(Minn. 1998).
134. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 121.
135. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
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136

that employee completes the required labor. The majority would
argue that this would most likely create a substantive right to
137
vacation pay, which it is trying to avoid creating.
The court did decide that earned but unpaid vacation pay is
138
Therefore, it
considered the same as earned but unpaid wages.
would hold that one could insert the word “wages” in the
contractual provisions in place of “PTO.” The contract condition
in question would then read “if your employment is terminated for
misconduct, you will not be eligible for pay in lieu of notice or
139
This is clearly a
payment of earned but unused [wages].”
violation of the payment mandates of Minnesota Statutes section
140
181.13(a) under any reading of that statute.
The plain reading
of the contract provisions in question clearly supported Lee’s right
to payment for her earned but unused paid time off and the
majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court was wrong in its
interpretation holding that it does not.
The court was quite willing to avoid interpreting the contract
through the accepted plain meaning device because it desperately
wanted to avoid creating a substantive right to vacation pay. This
desire to avoid the creation of a substantive right to vacation pay
manifests itself significantly in the court’s reading of Minnesota
Statutes section 181.13(a). The court decided that this statute only
mandates “when an employer must pay a discharged employee” and
141
The contract defined that
not “what an employer must pay.”
Lee’s PTO hours were already earned, and the statute required that
142
payment must take place within twenty-four hours of a demand.
Instead, the majority decided it must “consider ‘the
143
By trying to avoid
consequences of a particular interpretation.’”

136. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text.
137. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 125–26.
138. Id. at 124–25. “To the extent we have not spoken explicitly on this rule,
we now conclude that paid time off or vacation pay constitutes wages for purposes
of section 181.13(a).” Id. at 124–25. The court limited this definition of wages to
apply only to Minnesota Statutes section 181.13(a) and not any other statute that
involves wages. Id. at 125 n.3.
139. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
140. See MINN. STAT. § 181.13(a) (2006). “When any employer employing
labor within this state discharges an employee, the wages or commissions actually
earned and unpaid at the time of the discharge are immediately due and payable
upon demand of the employee.” Id.
141. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 125 (emphasis added).
142. MINN. STAT. § 181.13(a).
143. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 129 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 645.16).
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undesirable consequences, the court created its own meaning to
144
If the court had interpreted the
the terms of the contract.
contract properly, then it should allow the contractual conditions
145
At the very least, the terms of
to “define what has been earned.”
the contract are ambiguous enough to remand for a jury
146
The court concluded that Lee was not even
determination.
147
entitled to a remand for trial.
148
If the right to vacation pay is “wholly contractual,” then a
provision outlining a vacation pay program must be subject to basic
contract interpretation. The court appears to have had two
significant goals in mind in its decision: to avoid the creation of a
149
substantive right to vacation pay and to protect the interests of
150
employers. By interpreting the contract in order to achieve those
goals, the majority in turn limits the contractual nature of vacation
pay provisions.
Had the court engaged in this basic exercise of contract
151
interpretation, it would have come to a very different conclusion.
The contract states that an employee “accrues” PTO each pay
152
There are no
period and “begin[s] to earn PTO upon hire.”
other conditions set forth in the contract language on the earning
153
of PTO. The notice condition contains the specific language that
it is a condition on who is “eligible to be paid for earned but unused
144. See id. at 126. The court reasons that although the contract states that an
employee earns PTO during each pay period, this is not a right to a direct
monetary payment and only a right to request time off. Id. The right to payment
comes after termination and is subject to contractual conditions. Id.
145. Id.
146. See supra Part VI.C.
147. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 130.
148. Id. at 126 (quoting Tynan v. KSTP, Inc., 247 Minn. 168, 177, 77 N.W.2d
200, 206 (1956)).
149. See id. at 126.
150. See id. at 129. The court specifically discusses the potentially dangerous
outcomes to employers such as creating uncertainty and making it more difficult
for them to structure their own vacation packages according to their needs. Id. at
126.
151. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 133 (Page, J., dissenting). Justice Page, in his dissent,
interprets the contract to state that an employee earns the right to vacation pay
throughout the career and that the notice provision is a condition subsequent to
the earning of PTO. Id. This condition would allow an employer to divest earned
wages from the employee and this would clearly be a violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 181.13(a). Id. at 134.
152. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
153. Id.; see also id. at 133 (Page, J., dissenting) (stating that the condition is a
condition precedent to payment).
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154

Paid Time Off (PTO).” This condition would divest an employee
155
of wages that she had earned. It would also provide a windfall for
the employer and a disproportionate forfeiture for the employee.
The employer would have had to pay these wages if it had been
156
requested while the employee was still employed.
VIII. OTHER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The Minnesota Supreme Court clearly failed to interpret the
contract at issue in the Lee case within the confines of accepted
157
The majority decided that it was more important to
practice.
protect employers and ensure that there was no substantive right to
158
vacation pay.
This decision, however, left Lee without any
compensation for the PTO hours that she had saved during her
employment. The court did not need to find a substantive right to
vacation pay in order for Lee to receive her earned, but unused,
PTO wages.
The court could have enabled payment to Lee of her earned
but unused vacation pay without finding a substantive right to
vacation pay. This contractual right does not have to be seen to be
in direct conflict with a substantive right to vacation pay. The
majority could have held Fresenius to its contract and stated that
employers are held to the words they use in their contracts in all
circumstances. This would uphold the contractual nature of
vacation pay without creating a substantive right to vacation pay. If
those words are unclear or ambiguous, then they are subject to
contract interpretation. If those words are plain and clear, then an
employer can keep those employees from earning the right to earn
vacation time. This is the most simple outcome the majority could
have determined, due entirely to the contractual nature of vacation
pay. If vacation pay is purely a contractual matter, then employers
may place any conditions on earning vacation pay. This is clearly
154. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
155. See id. at 133 (Page, J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 135 n.1; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229
(1981) (stating that the court can excuse a condition that would result in
disproportionate forfeiture).
157. See supra Part VII.
158. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 125. “Minnesota law does not provide for employee
vacation time or pay as of right; rather, the law permits employers to choose
whether to grant employees vacation benefits. When vacation benefits are
granted, employers have considerable discretion in choosing how and whether to
compensate employees for vacation time.” Id. at 126.
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the outcome anticipated by the majority.
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159

A. Estoppel
There are other remedies beyond the most basic ones that
have already been set forth. The majority made it clear that it
considered the right of an employer to place favorable conditions
on employees’ rights to payment for vacation time to be greater
than the employees’ rights to be paid for wages that they have
160
The court, however, could have placed a greater
earned.
emphasis on employees’ rights. Even if the court determined that
the plain meaning of the contract allowed the conditions to keep
Lee from earning a right to her vacation pay, the court could have
put aside that condition to emphasize its protection of employees
from burdensome and unfair employment contract provisions.
161
Equitable estoppel allows a court to do just that.
In order for a court to find equitable estoppel, it must find
that even if a party has valid rights, it acted “in such a way as to
162
In
induce another party to detrimentally rely on those actions.”
order for a party to take advantage of this doctrine, it must show
that there were promises made, that the party reasonably relied on
those promises, and that harm will occur without the action of the
163
court.
In Lee v. Fresenius Medical Care, Inc., there was an implicit
promise that an employee could indefinitely earn and accumulate
164
By allowing Lee to accumulate those hours with
vacation hours.
159. See id. at 125.
160. See id. at 127.
161. See BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 1007 (3d ed. 1969) (“promissory
estoppel”). This is referred to as promissory estoppel, but the terms are often
interchangeable. See Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263, 284–85 (1996). Promissory estoppel usually applies to
promises made outside of contracts and without consideration. See Constructors
Supply Co. v. Bostrom Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 291 Minn. 113, 116–17, 190
N.W.2d 71, 74 (1971). Although promissory estoppel may not directly apply in the
situation of an actual contract, courts often have great discretion in refusing to
enforce contract terms it finds to be inequitable. See Twin City Bldg. & Loan
Ass’n v. Johnson, 194 Minn. 1, 7, 259 N.W. 551, 553 (1935).
162. Pollard v. Southdale Gardens of Edina Condo. Ass’n, 698 N.W.2d 449, 454
(Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Drake v. Reile's Transfer & Delivery, Inc., 613
N.W.2d 428, 434 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)).
163. Id. (citing Hydra-Mac, Inc. v. Onan Corp., 450 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Minn.
1990)).
164. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 120.
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the promise that she would be able to receive payment for them at
any time, and knowing that she could be fired at any time for
misconduct and thus would be ineligible for payment for those
hours, Fresenius induced Lee to rely on that promise to her
165
The promise of payment was implicit in the
detriment.
employment contract, and it would be reasonable for an employee
to assume that she would not be fired from her job before she
166
Without the court’s action, Lee would lose
could cash them in.
payment for 181.86 hours of paid time off, which would amount to
167
$3,011.60.
This course of action would require the courts to make an
affirmative choice to place the needs of the employee over the
desire of the employer to withhold benefits from terminated
employees. The majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court,
however, appears to place the employer’s needs over those of the
168
This is unfortunate, especially in economically
employees.
difficult times, because an extra $3,011.60 would be a great help to
anyone.
B. Disproportionate Forfeiture
Beyond the nature of contracts allowing Lee to retain her PTO
hours without creating a substantive right to vacation pay and
equitable estoppel, there is another doctrine that would allow Lee
to be paid. If the court continued to hold that the notice provision
was a condition precedent to earning PTO and not a condition
precedent for payment of earned but unused wages, then the court
could still enable Lee to be paid. The court could use the
disproportionate forfeiture doctrine. A court could excuse a party
from a condition if it would “cause disproportionate forfeiture” so
long as the condition was not a “material part of the agreed
169
Forfeiture requires a loss of a right to an exchange
exchange.”
165. See id.
166. See id. The reasonableness of Lee relying on her continued employment
is undermined by the fact that she had six disciplinary actions within a period of a
few months preceding her termination. See id.
167. See id. at 121.
168. See supra Part VII.
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1981); see also Burger King
Corp. v. Family Dining, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 485, 493 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d mem., 566
F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1977) (refusing to strictly enforce a contractual provision
because it would amount to a forfeiture for one of the parties). Although this rule
has not been directly applied to Minnesota by Minnesota courts, it has been
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170

on the expectation of that exchange.
It is disproportionate if
what is lost outweighs the risk from which the drafting party sought
protection by the contract condition and the degree of protection
171
that will be lost by excusing the condition.
The application of this rule would be similar to that of
equitable estoppel because it could be argued that Lee reasonably
expected to be paid for her earned but unused vacation time, she
lost her right to that exchange by failing to resign with notice, and
the vacation pay provision was not a material part of her
172
The balancing test which
employment with Fresenius.
determines disproportionality falls within the discretion of the
173
The condition is aimed at protecting Fresenius from the
court.
risk of having to pay earned but unused vacation pay to employees
174
This protection would
that are terminated for misconduct.
clearly be lost if the court decided that this condition should not be
enforced. Since this determination falls within the discretion of
the court, and the majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court clearly
holds that employer’s rights are greater than those of employees,
175
this final solution would probably fail.
IX. CONCLUSION
The goal of the majority is apparent: they sought to avoid
creating a substantive right to vacation pay while protecting
employers’ ability to impose favorable contracts on employees.
When the plain meaning of words impedes one’s goal, one must
make a decision to either abide by that meaning or find some way
around it. In Lee v. Fresenius Medical Care, Inc., the Minnesota
176
Supreme Court decided on the latter.
The Lee case appears on its face to be a simple discussion of
earned but unpaid vacation hours and the mandate of Minnesota
Statutes section 181.13(a) that employers pay unpaid wages to

extensively discussed by federal courts relating to Minnesota cases. See Video
Update, Inc. v. Videoland, Inc., 182 F.3d 659, 664 (8th Cir. 1999); American Ins.
Co. v. C.S. McCrossan, Inc., 829 F.2d 702, 705 (8th Cir. 1987).
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 cmt. b (1981).
171. Id.
172. See supra Part VIII.A.
173. See American Ins. Co., 829 F.2d at 705.
174. See Lee v. Fresenius Med. Care, Inc., 741 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. 2007).
175. See supra Part VII.
176. See Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 130.
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177

terminated employees.
The discharged employee made a
demand for payment of earned but unused vacation pay, but the
178
The Minnesota Supreme Court decided that
employer refused.
vacation pay was to be considered the same as wages under the
179
statute, but the employee was not entitled to payment.
The court determined that the right to vacation pay under
common law is entirely contractual and employers have the right to
180
dictate any terms on which an employee earns paid time off. The
court, however, failed to use any tools of contract interpretation to
181
determine the meaning of the words present in the contract.
Instead, it interpreted the contract in an effort to achieve the goals
of avoiding the creation of a substantive right to vacation pay and
182
protecting the interests of employers.
If the court had upheld
the contractual nature of vacation pay through interpretation, it
could have avoided creating an absolute right to vacation pay while
maintaining the intent behind section 181.13(a).
Vacation pay in Minnesota has long been held to be a creature
183
The words in the contract at issue in Lee were the
of contracts.
great foe of the reality sought by the majority. These words are
unambiguous and they should have been given their plain and
184
The
ordinary meaning even if it led to an undesirable result.
court could have still achieved its goals without blatantly
disregarding common law contract interpretation. If it held
Fresenius accountable for the language in its own contract, then it
would send a message to employers to be more careful in the way
they craft their employee handbooks. Words do not need to be the
enemy and can be used to achieve just ends, even if that has been
forgotten by the Minnesota Supreme Court.

177. MINN. STAT. § 181.13(a) (2006). The statute requires employers to pay
discharged employees the “earned and unpaid” wages within twenty-four hours of
a demand. Id.
178. Lee, 741 N.W.2d at 121.
179. Id. at 130.
180. See id. at 126.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 129–30.
183. See id. at 123; Tynan v. KSTP, Inc., 247 Minn. 168, 178, 77 N.W.2d 200,
206 (1956); Edelstein v. Duluth, M. & I. Range Ry. Co., 225 Minn. 508, 522,
31 N.W.2d 465, 473 (1948); Brown v. Tonka Corp., 519 N.W.2d 474, 475 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1994).
184. See Bank Midwest v. Lipetzky, 674 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn. 2004) (quoting
Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d 339, 346-47 (Minn. 2003)).
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